網友心得
BoJ剛宣示每年2%通膨的目標，但另外一方面美國政府對於升息卻也磨刀霍霍。重點是現在幾乎全球的環境都處於一種低利的狀態，這是一種持續很久的狀態而且危及了巨量退休基金、政府基金以及保險基金所保障的固定收益。
經濟學人這篇文章建議可以採取凱恩斯+小政府主義，就是藉由擴大基礎建設並促進私人參與，但這邊的重點是要引入技術官僚為主的決策系統(例如獨立的委員會)，目前推崇的對象是英國的辦公室預算中心。
個人結論：這些重點內容或許可以作為觀察世界上未來哪個國家會率先復甦的指標，但作為一個升斗小民，應該就是盡量控制好自己的風險並求追逐資產增加的幅度與貨幣貶值幅度相同、擴增。上不了M的頂端至少也別跌到M底去
Central banks have been doing their best to pep up demand. Now they need help
Sep 24th 2016 | From the print edition
THEY do not naturally crave the limelight. But for the past decade the attention on central bankers has been unblinking—and increasingly hostile. During the financial crisis the Federal Reserve and other central banks were hailed for their actions: by slashing rates and printing money to buy bonds, they stopped a shock from becoming a depression. Now their signature policy, of keeping interest rates low or even negative, is at the centre of the biggest macroeconomic debate in a generation.
The central bankers say that ultra-loose monetary policy remains essential to prop up still-weak economies and hit their inflation targets. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) this week promised to keep ten-year government bond yields around zero. On September 21st the Federal Reserve put off a rate rise yet again. In the wake of the Brexit vote, the Bank of England has cut its main policy rate to 0.25%, the lowest in its 300-year history.
But a growing chorus of critics frets about the effects of the low-rate world—a topsy-turvy place where savers are charged a fee, where the yields on a large fraction of rich-world government debt come with a minus sign, and where central banks matter more than markets in deciding how capital is allocated. Politicians have waded in. Donald Trump, the Republican presidential nominee, has accused Janet Yellen, the Fed’s chairman, of keeping rates low for political reasons. Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister, blames the European Central Bank for the rise of Alternative for Germany, a right-wing party.
This is a debate on which both sides get a lot wrong. It is too simple to say that central bankers are causing the low-rate world; they are also reacting to it. Real long-term interest rates have been declining for decades, driven by fundamental factors such as ageing populations and the integration of savings-rich China into the world economy (see article). Nor have they been reckless. In most of the rich world inflation is below the official target. Indeed, in some ways central banks have not been bold enough. Only now, for example, has the BoJ explicitly pledged to overshoot its 2% inflation target. The Fed still seems anxious to push up rates as soon as it can.
Yet the evidence is mounting that the distortions caused by the low-rate world are growing even as the gains are diminishing. The pension-plan deficits of companies and local governments have ballooned because it costs more to honour future pension promises when interest rates fall (see article). Banks, which normally make money from the difference between short-term and long-term rates, struggle when rates are flat or negative. That impairs their ability to make loans even to the creditworthy. Unendingly low rates have skewed financial markets, ensuring a big sell-off if rates were suddenly to rise. The longer this goes on, the greater the perils that accumulate.
To live safely in a low-rate world, it is time to move beyond a reliance on central banks. Structural reforms to increase underlying growth rates have a vital role. But their effects materialise only slowly and economies need succour now. The most urgent priority is to enlist fiscal policy. The main tool for fighting recessions has to shift from central banks to governments.
To anyone who remembers the 1960s and 1970s, that idea will seem both familiar and worrying. Back then governments took it for granted that it was their responsibility to pep up demand. The problem was that politicians were good at cutting taxes and increasing spending to boost the economy, but hopeless at reversing course when such a boost was no longer needed. Fiscal stimulus became synonymous with an ever-bigger state. The task today is to find a form of fiscal policy that can revive the economy in the bad times without entrenching government in the good.
That means going beyond the standard response to calls for more public spending: namely, infrastructure investment. To be clear, spending on productive infrastructure is a good thing. Much of the rich world could do with new toll roads, railways and airports, and it will never be cheaper to build them. To manage the risk of white-elephant projects, private-sector partners should be involved from the start. Pension and insurance funds are desperate for long-lasting assets that will generate the steady income they have promised to retirees. Specialist pension funds can advise on a project’s merits, with one eye on eventually buying the assets in question.
But infrastructure spending is not the best way to prop up weak demand. Ambitious capital projects cannot be turned on and off to fine-tune the economy. They are a nightmare to plan, take ages to deliver and risk becoming bogged down in politics. To be effective as a countercyclical tool, fiscal policy must mimic the best features of modern-day monetary policy, whereby independent central banks can act immediately to loosen or tighten as circumstances require.
Small-government Keynesianism
Politicians will not—and should not—hand over big budget decisions to technocrats. Yet there are ways to make fiscal policy less politicised and more responsive. Independent fiscal councils, like Britain’s Office for Budget Responsibility, can help depoliticise public-spending decisions, but they do nothing to speed up fiscal action. For that, more automaticity is needed, binding some spending to changes in the economic cycle. The duration and generosity of unemployment benefits could be linked to the overall joblessness rate in the economy, for example. Sales taxes, income-tax deductions or tax-free allowances on saving could similarly vary in line with the state of the economy, using the unemployment rate as the lodestar.
All this may seem unlikely to happen. Central banks have had to take on so much responsibility since the financial crisis because politicians have so far failed to shoulder theirs. But each new twist on ultra-loose monetary policy has less power and more drawbacks. When the next downturn comes, this kind of fiscal ammunition will be desperately needed. Only a small share of public spending needs to be affected for fiscal policy to be an effective recession-fighting weapon. Rather than blaming central bankers for the low-rate world, it is time for governments to help them.
他們不自然渴望的風頭。但是，在過去的十年對央行官員的關注度一直一眨不眨和越來越不友好。在金融危機期間，美聯儲和其他央行被稱讚為自己的行為：通過大幅削減利率和印鈔票購買國債，就成為一個抑鬱症停止電擊。現在維持低利率甚至為負，他們的簽名政策，是在一代人最大的宏觀經濟爭論的中心。
央行行長說，超寬鬆的貨幣政策仍然至關重要撐起仍然疲弱的經濟和擊中了他們的通脹目標。日本央行（BOJ）本週承諾將維持零附近十年期政府債券收益率。在9月21日美聯儲推遲升息又一次。在的Brexit投票之後，英國央行已削減其主要政策利率至0.25％，在其300年的歷史最低水平。
但是對於低速率的世界一個顛三倒四的地方，儲戶收取費用，其中豐富的世界政府債務的大部分產量都配有減號，並在那裡的影響的批評音柱越來越多的合唱團央行重要比市場更在決定資金如何分配。政客們趟過。唐納德·特朗普，共和黨總統候選人指責耶倫，美聯儲的主席，保持低利率出於政治原因的。沃爾夫岡·朔伊布勒，德國財長，指責歐洲央行的另類崛起德國，一個右翼政黨。
這是一個辯論，雙方得到了很多錯誤。這是太簡單的說，中央銀行是導致低速率的世界;它們也反應了。實際長期利率一直在下降了幾十年，由基本面因素驅動的，如人口老齡化和集成豐富的儲蓄的中國與世界經濟（見文章）。他們也一直不計後果。在大多數發達國家通脹的官方目標之下。事實上，在某些方面，央行一直沒夠大膽。只是現在，舉例來說，有日本央行明確承諾過衝其2％的通脹目標。美聯儲似乎仍然急於盡快，因為它可以推升利率。
然而，越來越多的證據所造成的低速率全球失真即使在增益遞減增長。企業和地方政府的養老金計劃赤字激增，因為它的成本兌現未來的養老金承諾當利率下降（見文章）。銀行，通常賺錢從短期和長期利率之間的差異，當利率持平或負鬥爭。這會損害他們發放貸款，甚至向有信譽的能力。無休止的低利率已經扭曲金融市場，確保大肆拋售，如果率突然上升。這正好在較長，即累積的危險就越大。
要在低速率的世界安全地生活，現在是時候超越對央行的依賴。結構改革來提高潛在增長率有至關重要的作用。但它們的影響兌現緩慢和經濟現在需要救助。最當務之急是爭取財政政策。打架經濟衰退的主要工具有從央行轉移到政府。
任何人誰記得上世紀60年代和70年代，這種想法會顯得既熟悉又令人擔憂。當時政府想當然地認為這是他們的責任打氣的需求。問題是，政治家們擅長的減稅和增加開支來刺激經濟，但是當不再需要這樣的刺激倒車當然無望。財政刺激成了一個越來越大的國家的代名詞。今天的任務是找到財政政策的一種形式，可以恢復的不好的時候不經濟的好固守政府。
這意味著超越，為更多的公共支出調用的標準反應，即：基礎設施投資。需要明確的是，在消費生產性基礎設施是一件好事。大部分富裕國家可以與新的收費公路，鐵路和機場做的，它永遠不會便宜構建它們。要管理的白色大象項目的風險，私營部門的合作夥伴應該從一開始就參與其中。養老金和保險資金是絕望的長期資產，將產生他們已經答應退休人員穩定的收入。專業養老基金可以在最終購買問題資產上項目的優點提醒，用一隻眼睛。
但基礎設施支出是不是撐起需求疲軟的最佳途徑。雄心勃勃的資本項目不能和關閉微調經濟。他們計劃，以年齡來提供和政治風險變得陷入了一場噩夢。為了達到有效的反週期工具，財政政策必須模仿現代的貨幣政策，即獨立的中央銀行可以立即採取行動，放鬆或收緊的情況需要的最佳功能。
小政府凱恩斯主義
政治家不會，也不應該，拱手大的預算決策的技術官僚。然而，也有辦法，使財政政策較少政治化，反應更靈敏。獨立的財政委員會，像英國的辦公室預算責任，可以幫助公眾非政治化支出的決定，但他們沒有加快財政行動。為此，更多的自動化需要，結合一定的消費在經濟週期的變化。持續時間和失業福利的慷慨可能與經濟總體失業率，例如。銷售稅，所得稅扣除或儲蓄免稅的補貼可能與經濟狀況同樣行有所不同，採用了失業率的北極星。
這一切似乎不可能發生。央行不得不因為政客迄今未能承擔他們承擔這麼大的責任，因為金融危機。但在超寬鬆貨幣政策的每一個新的轉折少力多的缺點。當下不景氣來臨時，這種財政彈藥將迫切需要。只需要影響財政政策的公共開支的一小部分是一個有效的經濟衰退的戰鬥武器。而不是指責央行行長的低速率的世界，現在是時候讓政府來幫助他們。
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